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Abstract
Research Summary: The platform literature offers
keen insights on the pricing and non-pricing strategies
that transaction platforms undertake. We supplement
this work by studying how platforms mix together their
strategic choices and the association with platforms’
performance. To that end, we focus on crowdfunding
platforms; a prominent setting of transaction platforms.
We present an inductive large-N study of the popula-
tion of 788 crowdfunding platforms that operated in
EU-15 countries up to 2018. Our contribution is three-
fold: (a) identifying common mixes of strategic choices;
(b) tracking deviations from these mixes; and (c) associat-
ing these with platforms’ survival and growth. We discuss
our findings and how they advance knowledge at the
intersection of the platform and strategic management
literatures.
Managerial Summary: Notable transaction-platforms
such as eBay, LinkedIn, and Tencent have an aggregate
market-value in the hundreds of billions of dollars. We
know that platforms’ success is driven by the strategic
choices they undertake. Yet, we know less about how
they mix together these choices and the association
with platforms’ performance. Our study addresses this
gap by focusing on a prominent setting: crowdfunding.
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Using data on the population of 788 crowdfunding plat-
forms in EU-15 countries, we show that these platforms
cluster around three common mixes of strategic
choices. Moreover, crowdfunding platforms do not
strictly adhere to the strategy mix they are affiliated
with. Interestingly, there is a positive association
between the degree to which a platform's choices differ-
entiate from its strategy mix and platform's subsequent
performance.
KEYWORD S
crowdfunding platforms, non-pricing strategies, platform
performance, pricing strategies, strategy mix, transaction platforms
1 | INTRODUCTION
Over the past decades, platform businesses have proliferated across different industries, from
real-estate brokerages (e.g., Zillow, Zoopla) to online marketplaces for talent, retail, or financial
services (e.g., Upwork, FarFetch, and LendingClub, respectively; Evans & Schmalensee, 2007;
Cusumano, Gawer, & Yoffie, 2019a). One of the major types of platform businesses is transac-
tion platforms (Cennamo, 2019; Evans & Gawer, 2016).1 These platforms create value by facili-
tating the exchange of products and services between two or more groups of participants
(Evans & Schmalensee, 2007; Gawer, 2014; Rochet & Tirole, 2003). Transaction platforms are
present across the globe, and the total market value of publicly-listed platforms such as
LinkedIn, Paypal and Tencent, surpasses $200 billion (Evans & Gawer, 2016).
A distinct feature of transaction platforms is the presence of network effects (Evans, 2003;
Rochet & Tirole, 2003) which may give rise to winner-takes-all dynamics (Arthur, 1989; Katz &
Shapiro, 1992). Scholars have shown that transaction platforms seek to unlock these dynamics
through a number of different strategic choices (Eisenmann, Parker, & van Alstyne, 2011;
Schilling, 2002). Extant work investigates the strategic choices that platforms undertake as a
function of the environment they target; namely, the underlying characteristics of the partici-
pants and/or their offerings (i.e., the products or services exchanged through the platform;
Boudreau & Hagiu, 2009; Eisenmann, Parker, & van Alstyne, 2006; Hagiu, 2014; Rochet &
Tirole, 2003). The literature identifies a number of platforms’ choices which broadly divide into
“pricing strategies” (i.e., the set of decisions about the fees charged to platform participants)
and “non-pricing strategies” (i.e., the set of decisions regarding platform design). Among the
three key pricing strategies, a platform chooses whether and how much to charge participants
as upfront subscription fees and per transaction fees, as well as to which group of participants it
should allocate those fees. Non-pricing strategies include three major choices as well: A plat-
form decides on the level of accessibility (i.e., participant pool), the degree of inclusivity
1There are a few platform typologies in the literature (e.g., Cennamo, 2019; Evans & Gawer, 2016; Gawer, 2014;
Jacobides, Cennamo, & Gawer, 2018). In addition to transaction platforms, extant work also points to platforms for
complementary innovation, or marketplaces for information.
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(i.e., the scope of offerings it accommodates) and bundling (i.e., the functions the platform
provides).
There are hundreds of possible ways in which a transaction platform can combine
these six choices.2 However, we know less about the overall mixes of strategic choices
that platforms undertake, or the impact of the mixes of choices on platforms’ perfor-
mance. The lacuna represents a fruitful avenue for research. Specifically, the strategy
literature has long advocated studying the overall mix of strategic choices, building on
the insight that the performance implications of any strategic decision crucially depends
on other strategic choices (Porter, 1996; Porter & Siggelkow, 2008). A recent review of
the platform literature embraced this insight and called for a comprehensive analysis of
the mixes of platforms’ strategic choices and their performance implications
(McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017).3
The purpose of our study is to address this gap by shedding light on transaction platforms’
strategy mixes and their association with platforms’ performance. To that end, we focus on a
prominent transaction platform setting: crowdfunding. Crowdfunding platforms serve as a con-
duit to aggregate funds—across a crowd of multiple individuals—by those who seek capital to
fund an innovative idea, a social cause, or life plans. Each crowdfunding platform undertakes
strategic choices such as choosing what offerings to accommodate, which participants to sup-
port, and what fees to charge them. Our study is guided by the following research questions:
How does a crowdfunding platform mix together the strategic choices it undertakes? What are
the implications of these strategy mixes—and differentiation therefrom—to platforms’ perfor-
mance? Exploring these issues is of value not only to those who study platforms but also to
strategy scholars who have a long tradition of investigating the overall mix of firm strategies
(Porter, 1996; Porter & Siggelkow, 2008).
We address the above questions using a hand-collected dataset of the European
crowdfunding sector. Specifically, we observe a population of 788 crowdfunding platforms that
operated in EU-15 countries up to 2018. The study is an inductive large-N study (Lyngsie &
Foss, 2017) which contributes to the literature through a data-driven rather than hypothesis-
testing approach (e.g., Birhanu, Gambardella, & Valentini, 2016; Claussen, Essling, &
Kretschmer, 2015). Our key results are threefold: (a) identifying common mixes of strategic
choices, (b) tracking deviations from these mixes, and (c) associating these with platforms’ sur-
vival and growth. We present the crowdfunding findings, in particular, and discuss generaliz-
able insights for transaction platforms, in general.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews work on transaction platforms’ stra-
tegic choices and makes the case for a comprehensive study of those choices. Then, we discuss
the crowdfunding setting as a context for studying transaction platforms. The methodology
section describes our data and the findings section presents the inductive analyses. The inter-
pretation section discusses four key insights that go beyond crowdfunding and inform the plat-
form literature. We conclude with the paper's main contributions and sketch managerial
implications and directions for future research.
2Assume each of the six strategic choices can take three values (i.e., high, medium, or low). It follows a platform has to
choose a strategy mix among hundreds of possibilities; 729 to be exact [= 36].
3“Strategic management scholars have attempted to address many issues related to firm-specific actions to leverage
network effects, yet significant uncertainty remains about optimal strategies in platform development and
management.” (McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017: 150).
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2 | TRANSACTION PLATFORMS AND THEIR STRATEGIC
CHOICES
Transaction platforms share two main features. The first is the presence of indirect network
effects. Indirect network effects imply that an increase in participants and offerings in one
group creates value to the other group (Hagiu, 2014). Second, transaction platforms create value
by facilitating interactions between participants who seek to exchange certain offerings
(Gawer, 2014; Rochet & Tirole, 2003). To that end, platforms undertake strategic choices to
shape the interactions among participants with the goal of consummating transactions.
In this section, we draw on the platform literature to identify the key strategic choices that
transaction platforms undertake. Then, we outline the rationale for a comprehensive study of
the mix of these choices. Our discussion focuses on the platform as the unit of analysis.
2.1 | Transaction platforms’ strategic choices: A brief literature
review
We compile a list of platform strategic choices. To this end, we leverage a recent literature
review by McIntyre and Srinivasan (2017).4 For each relevant study in the literature review, we
look for (a) the strategic choices it investigates and (b) the number and type of platforms
included in the empirical analyses, where available.5 This exercise highlights six key strategic
choices which we review below. The choices, summarized in Table 1, include three that are
known as “pricing strategies” and three others referred to as “non-pricing strategies.”
2.1.1 | Pricing strategies
An important set of choices every transaction platform undertakes has to do with the fees it
charges to its participants. These are known as “pricing strategies”. Extant work on the topic
identifies three major strategic choices: Subscription fees, transaction fees, and fee-allocation.
The first two determine how much participants pay, while the last strategy has to do with who
pays the fees (i.e., participants on which side of the platform).
We first consider subscription fees. Simply put, a subscription fee is the price participants
pay to participate in the platform (Caillaud & Jullien, 2003; Evans, 2003). The decision to set
subscription fees carries implications for platform performance. For example, setting subscrip-
tion fees at zero can lead to fast growth in the number of participants. But it may come at a cost;
it is possible that many participants with low-quality offerings will join the platform which can
reduce total transactions on the platform. Some platforms, such as credit card operators, apply
subscription fees to their participants (Stango, 2002), while others allow free access (Bryant &
Sheldon, 2017).
Pricing strategies also include the strategic choices regarding the transaction fees charged to
participants. A transaction fee is incurred by participants whenever they transact through the
platform (Parker & van Alstyne, 2005; Rochet & Tirole, 2003; Rochet & Tirole, 2006). The fee
4McIntyre and Srinivasan (2017) review studies of transaction platforms as well as studies of other platform types
(e.g., innovation platforms). Here, we review the studies that cover strategic choices by transaction platforms.
5To facilitate comparison across the studies, we label the strategic choices using names listed later in this Section.
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can be set as a fraction of the value of the transaction or as a nominal amount. A fee may take
the form of a usage fee; namely, participants are charged for the right to interact with others
(e.g., LinkedIn charges a fee for those who wish to send a message to other participants). Alter-
natively, a platform may set a success fee, charging only participants who have successfully con-
summated a transaction (e.g., Kickstarter levies a fee on successfully crowd-funded projects, but
if funding is not successful no fees accrue).
Finally, pricing strategies involve fee-allocation, which is aimed at solving the “chicken-and-
egg-problem” that is common for platforms (Parker & van Alstyne, 2005; Rochet &
Tirole, 2006). The optimal strategic choice for a platform may be to allocate different fees to dif-
ferent groups of participants (Caillaud & Jullien, 2003); namely, the group that is more price-
sensitive should be allocated lower fees to attract participants. In turn, this will induce partici-
pants on the “other side” to join, and the platform can recover its loss by allocating fees to these
“other-side” participants. It is common to observe platforms that allocate subscription fees
solely to the less price-sensitive group; Uber, for example, allocates subscription fees only to
drivers. Similarly, eBay charges only sellers (Lerner & Tirole, 2002; Li, Liu, &
Bandyopadhyay, 2010; Wan, Cenamor, Parker, & van Alstyne, 2017). The same can be said of
transaction fees: Airbnb charges fees to both hosts and guests, whereas many videogame plat-
forms charge a fee only to game-developers (Hagiu, 2009).
2.1.2 | Non-pricing strategies
Transaction platforms also engage in a host of strategic choices that go beyond fee-setting. They are
known as “non-pricing strategies” and involve various strategic choices regarding platform design.
Extant work addresses three major strategic choices: Accessibility, inclusivity, and bundling.6
Accessibility refers to platform choices that concern the participants. The objective is to regu-
late access to the platform.7 Specifically, accessibility choices control the number or type of par-
ticipants that can access the focal transaction platform. The goal is to attract a sufficient
number of the “right” kind of participants (Boudreau & Hagiu, 2009). Many transaction plat-
forms choose to “open up” in an effort to attract a broader participant pool (Boudreau, 2010;
Fuentelsaz et al., 2015). For example, AutoTrader, the car platform, chose to operate in English
and Spanish, and the employment platform, LinkedIn, supports 24 languages noting that “Hav-
ing multiple language profiles makes it easier for other members and recruiters to find you.”8
6Extant work also documents a variety of choices regarding user interface, ease of use and related technical
specifications (Gawer, 2014; Schilling, 2003; Suarez, 2004; Tiwana et al., 2010; Zhu & Iansiti, 2012). For example, eBay's
visually appealing user experience stands in contrast to another major classified platform, Craigslist, with its choice of a
text-only interface. Similarly, Uber is celebrated, in part, due to the ease of use of its mobile platform, and LinkedIn is
applauded for its productivity benefits (Hagiu, 2014).
7A transaction platform can also attempt to regulate its participants’ engagement with other platforms; e.g., explicitly
restricting participants from sharing offerings or within-platform-data on other platforms. Some platforms apply strict
restrictions, while others employ less explicit approaches or do not impose restrictions altogether (Cennamo &
Santalo, 2013; Claussen, Kretschmer, & Mayrhofer, 2013). The former is exemplified by OnTheMarket, a property
platform set up by UK estate agencies, which prohibited participants from listing their offerings on other platforms.
Payment cards are often viewed as an example of the latter, launching rewards programs as a nonexplicit approach to
encourage exclusive usage (Rysman, 2009). Also see footnote 14.
8AutoTrader states “Our goal is to serve this market how and where they want to be served—in English, in Spanish…”
(http://press.autotrader.com/news-releases?item=66766). The LinkedIn quote is available at (https://www.linkedin.
com/help/linkedin/answer/1717).
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At the same time, other platforms opt to curate participation. Many dating platforms, for
instance, restrict access to certain social groups with the goal of maximizing positive interac-
tions while minimizing negative ones (Evans & Schmalensee, 2008; Halaburda, Piskorski, &
Yıldırım, 2018). Finally, the decision to support multiple payment systems can broaden a plat-
form's accessibility because it enables transactions among a wide range of participants (e.g., a
crowdfunding platform may restrict payment to those with certified bank accounts, or also
allow anonymous payment via PayPal).
Inclusivity is focused on the offerings; namely, the scope of products and services a platform
accommodates. It refers to strategic choices a platform undertakes regarding the nature and
number of offerings allowed on the platform (Evans, 2003). Past evidence suggests platforms
view the scope of offerings as an important strategic choice, along with pricing strategies
(Clements & Ohashi, 2005). Notably, platforms differ in terms of the degree of inclusivity they
pursue (Eisenmann et al., 2006). For example, FarFetch specializes in luxury apparel and fash-
ion, focusing on an exclusive set of offerings that consists of leading brands and boutiques. In
contrast, eBay pursues an inclusive approach as it accommodates a wide range of sales catego-
ries, including apparel, as well as automobiles, sports memorabilia, and so on. There is notable
variation even within a given sector, as illustrated by transportation platforms. Lyft exclusively
accommodates participants who want to share rides whereas Uber allows ridesharing offerings
as well as drivers who make private rides in regular or luxury cars (i.e., UberX and Uber Exec).
One observes similar variation across crowdfunding platforms; JustGiving.com is an inclusive
platform accommodating donations to a wide range of causes, whereas MedGift.com focuses on
donations to cover medical expenses.
Bundling is focused on platform functionality; namely, the number of functions a platform
provides. For example, YouTube bundles at least two functions; the ability to upload and watch
videos, and an advertisement revenue-sharing function.9 Formally, bundling concerns strategic
choices that define a platform's market identity (Cennamo & Santalo, 2013). A platform may
choose to bundle functions from its current segment with those in neighboring market seg-
ments because it stands to enjoy economies of scale and scope (Eisenmann et al., 2011; Gawer &
Cusumano, 2008). The real estate platform Zillow.com bundles a rental management solution
and a mortgage function along with its marketplace for residential properties. At the other
extreme, platforms may opt to unbundle in an effort to sharpen their unique identity. For
instance, online classified platforms decided to unbundle the functions that online newspapers
traditionally served (i.e., generating news articles, sourcing advertisement as well as publishing
classifieds) and provide only the latter (Seamans & Zhu, 2014).
To conclude, we review six major strategic choices investigated in the platform literature.
Table 1 and the aforementioned discussion showcase the significant body of knowledge accu-
mulated to date. As is evident from the table, several studies have made the case that strategic
choices are not taken in isolation. We build on this insight, as well as on those from the strategy
literature, to motivate a comprehensive investigation of the overall mix of strategic choices that
platforms undertake.
9The YouTube example further illustrates the distinction between strategic choices [and their focus]; accessibility
[participants], inclusivity [offerings], and bundling [platform functionalities]. YouTube manages accessibility of certain
participants (e.g., Which languages and countries to focus on? Which age restrictions to introduce?), decides on
inclusivity in terms of the scope of offerings it supports (e.g., Exclude racially offensive content? Include how-to
tutorials?), and chooses what bundle of functions it provides (e.g., Only uploading and watching videos? Bundle an
additional function which provides revenue-sharing of advertisement income?).
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2.2 | Investigating platforms’ strategy mixes: The case for an
inductive study
The strategic management literature has long recognized the value of studying the overall mix
of firms’ strategies. The motivating insight is that superior performance arises as a result of cer-
tain combinations of firms’ strategies, because the outcome of any strategic decision crucially
depends on other strategic choices (Porter, 1996; Porter & Siggelkow, 2008).10 We know that
transaction platforms have the incentives and capabilities to manage their overall strategy mix
(Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Iansiti & Levien, 2004; Venkatraman & Lee, 2004). It is not surpris-
ing, thus, that within the platform literature there are calls for a comprehensive analysis of
“how price and nonprice instruments coexist [and] interact” (Boudreau & Hagiu, 2009: 25). We
advocate a study of platforms’ overall strategy mix. Our argument is twofold.
Empirically, there is growing evidence that platforms’ success is determined not by any indi-
vidual strategy, but rather by the combination of multiple strategic choices. Some evidence is
qualitative in nature (e.g., Boudreau & Hagiu, 2009; Li & Pénard, 2014). Quantitative analyses
further uncover the interplay between selected strategy pairs; for example, the level of partici-
pants’ accessibility and the degree of product inclusivity (Cennamo & Santalo, 2013). Notably,
even platforms that share a seemingly similar setting can successfully pursue different mixes of
strategic choices (Dushnitsky & Fitza, 2018; Halaburda et al., 2018). For example, the Chinese
marketplaces TaoBao and Tmall differ in their accessibility strategy (i.e., participating sellers
are companies on the latter, while they are mainly individuals on the former); inclusivity strat-
egy (i.e., the latter filters and verifies branded offerings whereas the former allows for all offer-
ings); and subscription fee (i.e., the latter charges upfront fees, which it attributes to the need to
weed out sellers of low quality or counterfeit goods). Finally, extant work brings to light the
adverse implications of a misguided strategy mix. Cennamo and Santaló (2015) attribute
Groupon's failure to a misalignment in the platform's accessibility and inclusivity choices. Our
discussion underscores a common thread across these studies; the insight that platforms’ suc-
cess is a function of their overall mix of strategic choices.
Theoretically, there is a prolific body of work on transaction platforms and their strategic
choices (Baldwin & Von Hippel, 2011; Gawer, 2014; Schilling, 1998, 2002; Zhu & Iansiti, 2012).
However, the work is fragmented across several distinct streams of literature that have evolved
independently. Works in economics, for example, underscore arm's-length pricing as one of the
central strategic choices of a transaction platform. Other studies view platforms as architects
delineating strategies and structures (Baldwin & Von Hippel, 2011; Boudreau, 2010;
Schilling, 1998, 2002; West, 2003; Zhu & Iansiti, 2012). There is, therefore, a host of theoreti-
cally motivated factors, but no single all-encompassing theory of platform strategies. As a result,
significant uncertainty remains about optimal strategies in platform development and manage-
ment (McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017).
In summary, the platform literature could benefit from a comprehensive study of explor-
atory nature. The study should be comprehensive in the sense that it systematically documents
the mix of strategic choices that a platform undertakes, and further details the performance
implications. It should be exploratory in the sense it does not anchor on a single theoretical per-
spective, but rather documents a common set of stylized facts from which one can derive
10Porter (1996) attributes Southwest airlines success to the mix of strategic choices it undertook regarding accessibility
(e.g., targeting secondary cities), offerings (e.g., no food), and prices (e.g., low fares).
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theoretical insights. To facilitate such an investigation, we focus on a particular, well defined,
context: the crowdfunding setting.
3 | TRANSACTION PLATFORMS: THE CROWDFUNDING
SETTING
Crowdfunding platforms are transaction platforms that serve as a conduit between individuals
who seek capital to fund an innovative idea, a social cause or life plans (crowdfundees hereaf-
ter), and prospective capital providers (crowdfunders hereafter) (Belleflame, Omrani, &
Peitz, 2015). Although shopping malls and credit cards are often given as examples of transac-
tion platforms (Evans & Schmalensee, 2008), crowdfunding platforms may be seen as closer to
other web-based transaction platforms, which have recently attracted scholarly attention
(Cusumano, Gawer, & Yoffie, 2019a, 2019b). Web-based transaction platforms include real
estate platforms (e.g., Zillow, Zoopla), services or gig-economy platforms (e.g., Upwork, Fiverr),
travel and transportation platforms (e.g., Expedia, Uber), dating platforms (e.g., eHarmony,
Match.com), and so on. Similar to these transaction platforms, crowdfunding platforms create
value by facilitating interactions and transactions (Evans & Schmalensee, 2016).
At the same time, the crowdfunding setting has some distinct features (Dushnitsky &
Zunino, 2019). Understanding the environmental factors that characterize this setting can
aid in interpreting observed patterns. It can also inform their applicability to other transac-
tion platforms (Boudreau & Jeppesen, 2015). Accordingly, we discuss the crowdfunding set-
ting along three dimensions: (a) the nature of the offerings (i.e., the products or services)
that participants exchange through the platform; (b) the type of participants and the way in
which they interact and consummate their transactions; and (c) the nature and intensity of
the market failures and frictions that underlie the interactions. The choices that
crowdfunding platforms undertake should be viewed in light of these environmental fac-
tors, as we expand below.
First, consider the nature of the offerings. The products and services differ across the differ-
ent environments that transaction platforms target (Evans & Schmalensee, 2016). Some plat-
forms facilitate the exchange of physical goods (e.g., Autotrader, the marketplace for cars; eBay,
the auction marketplace; or Zillow, the real estate platform), while others focus on exchanges
of labor (e.g., Upwork, a generalist freelance platform; Angie's List, a platform targeted at home
contractors), or services (e.g., Skyscanner, a platform for flight booking). Crowdfunding plat-
forms facilitate the flow of capital to fund personal, social or business projects.
Second, consider the participants and the way in which they consummate their transactions.
Extant work notes that participants share an overarching goal (e.g., getting a ride, as in the case
of ride-sharing platforms, or finding a partner, as in the case of dating platforms), yet may be
heterogeneous in terms of their preferences and the utility that they obtain from a transaction
(Halaburda et al., 2018; Seamans & Zhu, 2017). Crowdfunding participants share the common
goal of exchanging money through the Internet, but they may be heterogeneous in their utility
and preferences. Some crowdfundees are entrepreneurs seeking to finance their ventures;
others are inventors searching for cheap capital to transform their ideas into marketable prod-
ucts; while others are activists championing social causes or simply people collecting money for
personal purposes (Belleflame et al., 2015). Similarly, among crowdfunders, there are individ-
uals who fund projects in expectation of financial returns; while others seek to fulfill social
goals or a balance of the two (Polzin, Toxopeus, & Stam, 2018).
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Another important dimension of variation is the way in which participants consummate
their transactions. Perhaps the most common approach is one-to-one, where there is a single
participant on each side of a realized transaction (e.g., Airbnb, eHarmony). However, there are
other approaches; for example, a core proposition of ride-sharing platforms (e.g., Lyft) is a one-
to-many transaction where a single car concurrently carries multiple passengers. In
crowdfunding, participants engage in many-to-one transactions: Each crowdfundee posts a pro-
ject on the platform and the project aggregates capital from multiple crowdfunders.
Third, transaction platforms are susceptible to various market failures and frictions
(Parker & van Alstyne, 2014). The type and intensity of these concerns vary across environ-
ments. They range from the mundane (e.g., the need to process payments from different sources
and through different payment systems) to the substantial (e.g., the presence of information
asymmetries). The intensity of the concerns is often a function of the environment; namely, the
characteristics of the offerings and participants. For example, platforms that facilitate the
exchange of well-defined commodity-like products or services (e.g., gardening tools on eBay, or
car rides via Uber) exhibit a relatively low level of information asymmetry. Conversely,
crowdfunding platforms may experience high information asymmetries between crowdfundees,
who intend to finance novel ideas and/or innovative entrepreneurial projects, and
crowdfunders, who evaluate the projects based on the information posted on the platform
(Courtney, Dutta, & Li, 2017). It is against this background that one understands the hallmark
of crowdfunding: Aggregating funds from the crowd. The many-to-one nature of transactions
helps in mitigating information asymmetry concerns, as the presence of multiple crowdfunders
enables project validation and risk-sharing (Bapna, 2019; Mollick & Nanda, 2016).
In sum, this section identifies three dimensions along which transaction platforms vary and
maps them onto our empirical setting. Charting the environmental features specific to the
crowdfunding setting aids with the interpretation of the strategic choices we document. It fur-
ther allows to derive theoretical implications to transaction platforms beyond crowdfunding.
4 | METHODOLOGY: DATA AND APPROACH
Several streams of work inform our knowledge of transaction platforms and their strategic
choices (Section 2). The literature review suggests that the current state of the literature is frag-
mented. Absent an all-encompassing theoretical framework, we avoid unwise hypotheses devel-
opment that is formulated solely for the purpose of legitimizing statistically significant results
(Bettis, 2012; Helfat, 2007). Rather, following Bettis, Gambardella, Helfat, and Mitchell (2014),
we undertake an inductive approach and present an exploratory study of platforms’ strategy
mix and performance.
We construct a large dataset (details below) and conduct what Lyngsie and Foss (2017)
define as an inductive large-N study. It is a quantitative-based approach that distills key facts
from a comprehensive large dataset. Inductive large-N studies are increasingly common in the
field of strategy (in addition to Lyngsie & Foss, 2017, see Birhanu et al., 2016; Claussen
et al., 2015). Hence, our study is positioned at a mid-point between the testing of specific
hypotheses and an open-ended exploratory contribution.11 Below, we describe the data as well
as the variables capturing strategic choices and platform performance. The findings
11The latter is associated with qualitative small-N research design that is usually employed in inductive studies
(Eisenhardt, 1989). For an excellent example in the platform literature, see Boudreau and Hagiu (2009).
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section reports the exploratory analyses; the interpretation section maps our findings to the
literature.
4.1 | Data collection
We developed a proprietary hand-collected database including information on the population
of hundreds of crowdfunding platforms in the EU-15 countries. We dropped platforms geared
towards one specific project or organization, as well as those solely serving professional inves-
tors.12 The data collection proceeded as follows. First, we identified the population of
crowdfunding platforms launched in the EU-15 countries through the end of 2017. We scanned
all European and national crowdfunding associations and listed their members. We also
reviewed crowdfunding studies that focused either on Europe as a whole or on individual EU-
15 countries. We then visited every platform's website to check whether it met our definition.
Second, once included in the database, we collected detailed data on platforms’ strategic choices
and performance through the end of 2018. The information was gleaned from platforms’
websites (both current and past pages accessed using the Wayback Machine internet archive),
associated Facebook and LinkedIn pages (if available), and the crowdfunding studies men-
tioned above. Third, we gained access to information about platforms’ web traffic through a col-
laboration with SimilarWeb, one of the major providers of web analytics services. It records
traffic information for over 80 million websites across 190 countries and 250 categories. These
efforts resulted in a comprehensive dataset covering the population of crowdfunding platforms
launched in the EU-15 countries. We observe 788 crowdfunding platforms, starting from 1999,
the year of the first crowdfunding platform was launched in Europe, and following their perfor-
mance through the end of 2018.
4.2 | Variables capturing platforms’ strategic choices and
performance
We constructed empirical proxies of (pricing and non-pricing) strategic choices, as well as the
performance of crowdfunding platforms. The strategic choices we considered mirror those iden-
tified through the literature review.
Platform pricing strategies are captured by the following three variables. The variable Sub-
scription_Fee equals 1 if the focal platform charges participants a subscription fee, and 0 other-
wise. We employ a binary variable for two reasons. First, as we describe later, a majority of
crowdfunding platforms do not levy a subscription fee. Second, among those that do charge a
subscription fee, some charge an absolute amount, while others set it as a percentage of
12Funding platforms dedicated to wealthy investors are excluded for the following reason. A common feature across
crowdfunding platforms is aggregation of capital (Belleflamme, Lambert, & Schwienbacher, 2014); “external financing
from a large audience [the ‘crowd’], in which each individual provides a very small amount.” The presence of multiple
small contributions is associated with network effects; both indirect (e.g., aggregating diverse customers’ and investors’
opinions reduces demand uncertainty and uncovers features of interest; Strausz, 2017) and direct effects (e.g., validating
the investment and creating momentum among other investors; Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2015; Kuppuswamy &
Bayus, 2018). While certain funding platforms cater to wealthy investors, this does not mean that wealthy individuals
are excluded from participation in the 788 platforms we study.
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crowdfundees’ funding target; such that there is not a meaningful continuous variable that is
systematically available for all the platforms in our dataset.
The variable Transaction_Fee captures the fee a platform charges to participants when a
transaction materializes. Most crowdfunding platforms set a transaction fee as a percentage of
the transaction amount. Hence, the continuous variable Transaction_Fee is the percentage of
the total capital raised that a platform charges when transactions materialize. We observe that
some platforms employ a fee schedule; for example, the French platform Ulule charges fees that
range from 1.67% to 4.17%, depending on the campaign's funding target. For such platforms,
Transaction_Fee is calculated as the average percentage value.
Finally, the variable Fee_Allocation equals 1 when the platform charges both crowdfunders
and crowdfundees, and equals 0 if platform fee(s) is (are) charged only to one group of
participants.13
We also constructed empirical proxies for the non-pricing strategies; accessibility, inclusivity
and bundling. Consider the choices aimed at controlling accessibility.14 As Internet-based plat-
forms, crowdfunding platforms are quite easy to access. That said, during our data collection
we identified a couple of factors that shape accessibility across European platforms: The lack of
awareness and the challenge to processing payments. For example, a platform that runs solely
in German may miss out on participants who do not speak the language (i.e., French or Spanish
speakers will be unaware of relevant projects). By listing projects in one or more widely spoken
languages, a platform can substantially increase awareness of prospective participants and thus
broaden accessibility. Namely, a crowdfunding platform can expand the pool of prospective par-
ticipants by doing so. The variable, Prosp_Participant_Pool_Lng, equals the number of millions
of people for whom the language(s) supported by the focal platform is the native language
(source: Ethnologue).
The choice of payment systems further impacts the platforms’ accessibility. Crowdfunders
and crowdfundees must exchange money for a transaction to materialize. To fulfill the transac-
tion, crowdfunding platforms have a choice of payment systems, ranging from traditional bank
transfers to online ones (e.g., PayPal, Stripe, and MangoPay). A crowdfunding platform may
choose to adopt multiple payment systems to boost the number of participants it can serve.
Accordingly, we construct the variable Prosp_Participant_Pool_Pymnt, computed as the number
of different payment systems adopted by a focal platform.
Offering_Inclusivity is a binary variable equal to 1 if the platform hosts a wide range of offer-
ings, and 0 otherwise. It is an indicator of the level of inclusivity on a focal platform. For exam-
ple, the variable is equal to 1 for a highly inclusive platform such as Seedrs, a UK platform for
investing in start-ups and later-stage businesses which does not apply industry or sector restric-
tions; or BuonaCausa, an Italian platform where people collect money for personal projects,
charities and causes, which does not impose any domain limitations. Conversely, the variable is
13Data on pricing strategies was unavailable for 172 platforms. For these platforms, we imputed the missing data by
substituting in the population median. The results are robust to dropping these observations.
14As for participants’ engagement with other crowdfunding platforms, it is often tightly regulated and crowdfundees are
usually discouraged from doing so. Anecdotally, they are advised to avoid simultaneously running campaigns on
multiple platforms because it bifurcates their efforts; it is time-consuming and dilutes the momentum of growing
investor numbers (and investment amounts) on a focal platform. It also decreases the chances of meeting the funding
threshold (where applicable). Theoretically, the advice can be traced to one of the main features of crowdfunding
platforms: aggregating funds from the crowd. The many-to-one feature helps to mitigate concerns because the presence
of multiple crowdfunders serves as a validation and risk-sharing mechanism (Bapna, 2019; Mollick & Nanda, 2016).
Hence, crowdfundees are encouraged to keep to one platform and grow the number of investors therein.
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set to 0 if a platform pursues an exclusive strategy; hosting projects dedicated to specific prod-
ucts or services (e.g., Musicstarter, a German platform launched to fund music projects by musi-
cians and bands), or projects focused on a specific geographical area (e.g., Ginger, an Italian
platform launched in the Emilia Romagna region that targets local projects).
The variable Bundling captures whether a focal platform bundles the functions of multiple
crowdfunding types. The crowdfunding literature identifies four distinct crowdfunding types. We
briefly describe them and assign a binary variable to each. Lending crowdfunding platforms enable
crowdfunders to solicit and manage interest payments in return for a loan (Lending = 1, else zero).
On equity platforms, crowdfunders receive an equity stake in the funded venture (Equity = 1, else
zero). Reward crowdfunding platforms enable crowdfundees to offer tangible or intangible rewards
in exchange for funding (Reward = 1, else zero). Finally, as the name suggests, donation
crowdfunding does not entail extrinsic rewards to crowdfunders (Donation = 1, else zero). Many plat-
forms choose to operate a single crowdfunding type. For these platforms the variable Bundling equals
0. However, there are platforms that opt to bundle several crowdfunding functions (Dushnitsky,
Guerini, Piva, & Rossi-Lamastra, 2016). For these platforms the variable Bundling equals 1.
As for platform performance, we constructed three variables. The first is a proxy of down-
side performance (i.e., dissolution), and the other two focus on up-side performance, using dif-
ferent proxies for platforms’ growth.
The variable Dissolved is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the platform dissolved prior to the
end of 2018, and zero else. The benefit of this variable is that we observe it for each and every platform
in our dataset. Moreover, it is a well-established proxy of performance; termination of operations has
been long utilized as an indicator of performance (e.g., Schilling, 2002; Seamans & Zhu, 2017). A plat-
form is classified as “dissolved” if it experienced one of the following three scenarios: The platform
website does not operate as of December 31, 2018 (e.g., the Belgian platformBelgodisc) or had not been
updated for several years (e.g., the German platform Crowdenergy); alternatively, the website explic-
itly states that the organization operating the platform had either failed or exited the crowdfunding
sector (e.g., the UK platform Solar Schools). Lastly, a platformmay have merged (e.g., the Italian plat-
form Crowdfunding-Italia, which merged with Kapipal) or redirected all traffic to another platform
(e.g., theUKplatformWeDidThis, whichmergedwith Crowdfunder).15
The second platform-performance variable captures the growth in the annual transaction
amount. Recall, the core proposition of a transaction platform is to facilitate transactions
between participants. Accordingly, the variable is a direct proxy of a platform's ability to realize
this objective. The variable Transactions_Growth is the logarithmic growth of the annual
amount (in thousands of euros) facilitated by a focal platform between 2016 and 2018. To con-
struct this variable, we used the Wayback Machine Internet archive to capture screenshots of
the homepages on the last days of every year. We hand-collected information from the follow-
ing sources: (a) several platforms report the annual transaction amount in a dedicated section,
including detailed platform stats (e.g., stats.goteo.org); (b) others report only the cumulated
amount raised, usually on the platform's homepage (e.g., www.lendahand.com); and (c) where
applicable, we calculated the annual amount by summing the individual capital raised across
all the crowdfunding campaigns consummated that year.
15We recognize there is a marked difference between a platform (a) ceasing its crowdfunding operation, and
(b) undergoing M&A. The former can be viewed as negative performance, while M&A may be interpreted as a positive
performance. We combined the two scenarios in one variable because M&A is a rare event for European crowdfunding
platforms: out of 788 platforms, 311 ceased crowdfunding operation (39%) and only 21 (3%) merged. We ran two
robustness tests; a probit excluding the 21 merged platforms, and a multinomial probit discerning M&A from
dissolution. The results are robust and available upon request.
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The third platform-performance variable captures the growth in web traffic to the platform.
It has been recently used as a performance proxy in the fields of information systems and
finance (Burtch, Ghose, & Wattal, 2013; Kerr, Lerner, & Schoar, 2014). To construct this mea-
sure, we collaborated with SimilarWeb, a leading provider of web analytics services. It captures
web traffic information for the universe of active websites that met a minimum threshold of
5,000 nonunique monthly visits. Through our collaboration we obtained historical web traffic
records dating back to the start of SimilarWeb records. Using these data, we constructed
Traffic_Growth for every platform that was active through the end of 2018 and had a standalone
domain. The variable Traffic_Growth is the logarithm of the growth in web traffic between the
median monthly traffic in 2017 and the median traffic in 2018.
5 | FINDINGS
5.1 | Descriptive statistics on strategic choices
We observe substantial variation in platforms’ adoption of specific strategic choices. For
instance, 84% of the European crowdfunding platforms charge transaction fees to crowdfundees
who successfully secured funding, yet only 4% levy fees on both participant groups
(i.e., crowdfundees and crowdfunders). The vast majority of platforms charge transaction fees,
while a small minority (12%) opts for subscription fees. As for non-pricing strategies, platforms
are almost evenly split in terms of inclusivity, with 48% (52%) of the platforms operating a wide
(narrow) range of offerings. About 53% of the platforms opt to broaden the pool of prospective
participants by supporting languages spoken by more than 200 million individuals (for compari-
son, the total European population is 406 million as of 2016), and 74% of the platforms broaden
accessibility by adopting multiple payment systems. Finally, we observe that 16% bundle differ-
ent crowdfunding functions within the same platform.
Table 2 captures correlations among pairs of strategic choices. It uncovers several interesting
patterns. Among pricing strategies, platforms that choose to charge subscription fees tend to adopt
lower transaction fees (correlation between Subscription_Fee and Transaction_Fee: −0.12; p-value:
.00) and are moderately more likely to charge both crowdfunders and crowdfundees (correlation
with Fee_Allocation: 0.09; p-value: .01). Within non-pricing strategies, we observe similar correla-
tions of low to moderate magnitude. Table 2 also indicates correlations between pricing and non-
pricing strategies. For example, the decision to levy a subscription fee is positively correlated with
the adoption of an inclusive offering strategy (correlation between Subscription_Fee and
Offering_Inclusivity: 0.11; p-value: .00); yet it is not significantly correlated with broadening the par-
ticipant pool through the adoption of widely spoken languages (correlation between Sub-
scription_Fee and Prosp_Participant_Pool_Lng: −0.00; p-value: .95). In sum, we observe correlations
of meaningful magnitudes for many pairs of strategic choices. These correlations indicate there are
systematic patterns to the strategic choices that platforms undertake. The Appendix further exem-
plifies this point through bivariate analysis of selected strategy pairs.
5.1.1 | Platforms’ strategy mixes
To the extent platforms undertake a comprehensive approach to their strategic choices, we are
in need of a methodology that can capture their strategy mixes (Hambrick, 1983; Porter &
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Siggelkow, 2008).16 Following prior work, we run a cluster analysis to unveil similarities in plat-
forms’ strategy mixes (Gruber, Heinemann, Brettel, & Hungeling, 2010; Ichniowski, Shaw, &
Prennushi, 1997; Leiponen&Drejer, 2007). The cluster analysis groups the platforms such that the sta-
tistical variance among platforms clustered together is minimized while between-cluster variance is
maximized. To that end, we employed a common two-step clustering procedure (Short McKenny,
Ketchen, Snow, & Hult, 2016; Jansen, Simsek, & Cao, 2012). As inputs to the cluster analysis, we
included all the proxies of platforms’ strategic choices and further standardized them to address con-
cerns arising from scale differences (Milligan & Hirtle, 2003). The two-step clustering procedure first
entailed running hierarchical cluster analysis developed by Ward (1963) to determine the number of
clusters and their centroids. Next, we drew on the output from the first stage and assigned platforms to
clusters using the k-means nonhierarchical clustering method.17 The cluster analysis highlights three
groups of platformswhere each group deploys a similarmix of strategic choices.
Table 3 (Panel a) reports variables mean values across each of the three clusters as well as for the
overall sample.18 The Scheffé post hoc tests are used to gauge variable values that statistically differ
across clusters.Where there are no significant differences between clusters, the variable is assigned the
same superscript label. Table 3 (Panel b) translates these superscripts into verbal bracket names for
TABLE 2 Correlations of platform strategic choices
Subscription
Transac-
tion_Fee
Fee_
Allocation
Prosp_
Participant_
Pool_Lng
Prosp_
Participant_
Pool_Pymnt
Offering_
Inclusivity
Subscription_Fee 1.000 [.000]
Transaction_Fee −0.118 [.001] 1.000 [.000]
Fee_Allocation 0.094 [.008] −0.038 [.282] 1.000 [.000]
Prosp_
Participant_
Pool_Lng
−0.002 [.946] −0.032 [.369] −0.016 [.661] 1.000 [.000]
Prosp_
Participant_
Pool_Pymnt
−0.087 [.014] 0.016 [.653] −0.095 [0.008] 0.111 [.002] 1.000 [.000]
Offering_Inclusivity 0.112 [.002] −0.096 [.007] 0.108 [.002] 0.105 [.003] −0.018 [.615] 1.000 [.000]
Bundling 0.046 [.195] 0.019 [.596] −0.039 [.273] 0.036 [.310] 0.073 [.039] 0.073 [.042]
Note: p values in square brackets.
16In his seminal test of Porter's framework, Hambrick (1983) argues cluster analysis is the appropriate approach to study firm
strategy; “Regression indicates the independent effects of strategic attributes on [performance]; but, without a complex web
of interaction terms, regression does not reveal which combinations of attributes are particularly good or bad. For example,
from the regression results noted above one could conclude that [a firm] will do well if it has these characteristics: patented
innovations, high capacity utilization, a relatively broad domain, and low vertical integration. But, because regression quite
literally identifies the isolated effects of each independent variable, nothing is known about whether it makes sense to pursue
these characteristics in concert. It may be that this combination of attributes in a single business actually leads to very low
performance or, more likely, that this combination simply is not very feasible.” (p. 696).
17The Stata commands cluster wardslinkage and cluster kmeans were used to estimate the first and second parts of the
cluster analysis, respectively. To determine the number of clusters in the data set we considered the popular Duda–Hart
stopping rule (Duda, Hart, & Stork, 2011; Everitt, Landau, Leese, & Stahl, 2011) which has been used in prior work
(e.g., Criscuolo, Dahlander, Grohsjean, & Salter, 2017; Haas, Criscuolo, & George, 2015; Thatchenkery, Katila, &
Chen, 2012). Using the Calinski–Harabasz pseudo-F yields equivalent clustering.
18Table 3 reports the variables in original units (i.e., nonstandardized values) for clarity and ease of interpretation.
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ease of interpretation, in line with Gruber et al. (2010). Specifically, we denote whether each strategic
choice within a focal cluster is associated with low or high values compared to the other clusters. In
this section, we describe the three clusters and the mix of crowdfunding strategic choices they repre-
sent. General labels were used to name the clusters in order to facilitate interpretation of the findings
(see Section 6 for discussion of generalizable implications). To avoid overly lengthy labels, the names
identify only those non-pricing and pricing strategies onwhich the cluster scores high.
The cluster Catch Participants, Charge Transactions, Asymmetrically is the most populated of the
three. It consists of 365 crowdfunding platforms. Over half of the platforms facilitate reward
crowdfunding; and the remainder is donation crowdfunding platforms.19 As for other non-pricing
strategies, one observes a nuanced approach whereby the platforms are highly expansive on one
dimension and more focused on another dimension. A typical platform engages in a broad accessibil-
ity strategy; using languages spoken by over 300 million individuals and supporting several payment
systems. At the same time, the platforms pursue a narrow, exclusive, range of offerings.20 As for pric-
ing strategies, the platforms usually charge high transaction fees to crowdfundees. They do not pur-
sue subscription fees; nor do they allocate fees to the other participant group (i.e., crowdfunders).
One could argue that these platforms cleverly juxtapose pricing and non-pricing strategies
as a way to maximize successful transactions. The choice of high accessibility along with a nar-
row, exclusive range of offerings implies that the platforms seek to attract the largest possible
pool while focusing on like-minded participants in terms of their preferences or interests. More-
over, the pricing choices encourage prospective participants to join the platform and browse or
post projects of interest. To that end, the platforms charge (a) zero or trivial fees to
crowdfunders, and (b) high fees to crowdfundees, but mainly on successful transactions. To
facilitate performance analyses, we defined the variable Participants_Transactions_Asy which
equals 1 for platforms affiliated with this cluster, else zero.
The second cluster, Catch Offerings, Charge Subscription, Symmetrically, is populated by
315 crowdfunding platforms. About half of these platforms are lending and the other half are
equity crowdfunding platforms.21 A common feature of these platforms is that the dominant
logic for both participant groups is one of engaging in a financial transaction. The crowdfundees
seek funding and the crowdfunders participate in anticipation of a monetary return. As for the
other non-pricing strategies, the specific choices seem to be the inverse of those observed for
the previous cluster. Still, we observe a subtle balance between inclusivity and accessibility. On
the one hand, the platforms host a wide range of offerings; that is, a “catch all” strategy. On the
other hand, their accessibility strategy is less broad; in comparison to other clusters, these
platforms reach fewer prospective participants as they use less widely spoken languages and
support fewer payment systems. As for pricing strategies, the platforms are (a) more likely
to charge subscription fees, and (b) transaction fees are set at a lower percentage than other
platforms. Also, fees are allocated symmetrically to both participant groups.
These 315 platforms also pursue a nuanced mix of strategic choices. Yet, whereas platforms in the
Catch Participants, Charge Transactions, Asymmetrically cluster seem to adopt a “go deep” strategy
19As illustrated by binary variables values for Reward (0.53) and Donation (0.46) in Table 3, Panel a (Cluster 1).
20This is not to say that every donation platform strictly adheres to this profile. For example, the prominent donation
platform GoFundMe explicitly chose to include campaigns across a wide range of causes and domains. It is noteworthy
that the platform opted to uphold its approach even in the face of external pressures to prune certain offerings
(e.g., calls to avoid hosting campaigns associated with politically sensitive issues such as abortion, alt-right causes, etc.).
We thank the editors and an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this example.
21Lending and equity crowdfunding platforms populate the cluster at about equal fractions, as is evident from the value
of 0.5 for each of the respective indicators; Lending and Equity (Table 3, Panel a: Cluster 2).
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mix, those in the currentCatch Offerings,Charge Subscription, Symmetrically cluster opt for a “gowide”
approach. To see that, note that the choice of an inclusive offering strategy is geared toward increasing
the number of projects. At the same time, the pricing choices operate in tandem to levy (a) significant
TABLE 3 Crowdfunding strategy mixes: Clusters of platforms with similar strategic choices
Panel a: Cluster analysis results
Cluster 1: Cluster 2: Cluster 3:
Variables
Sample
mean
Catch participants,
charge transactions,
asymmetrically
(n = 365)
Catch offerings,
charge subscription,
symmetrically
(n = 315)
Catch all,
charge high
(n = 108)
Subscription_Fee 0.120 0.036b 0.206a 0.157a
Transaction_Fee 4.854 5.117a 4.548b 4.858b
Fee_Allocation 0.043 0.003b 0.095a 0.028b
Prosp_Participant_Pool_Lng 279.6 296.4a 248.1b 314.7a
Prosp_Participant_Pool_Pymnt 2.095 2.296a 1.781b 2.333a
Offering_Inclusivity 0.481 0.307b 0.654a 0.565a
Bundling 0.155 0.000b 0.044b 1.000a
Equity 0.240 0.000c 0.505a 0.278b
Lending 0.242 0.000c 0.533a 0.213b
Reward 0.378 0.534b 0.000c 0.954a
Donation 0.324 0.466b 0.006c 0.768a
Note: In the columns capturing the three clusters, cluster means are reported in original units. In each row, cluster
means with the same superscript are not significantly different (p < .1) on the basis of Sheffe post hoc test. The
highest bracket is labeled with superscript “a”, the next highest bracket with superscript “b”, and so on.
Panel b. Verbal description of cluster average strategy mix
Variables
Cluster 1: Cluster 2: Cluster 3:
Catch participants,
charge transactions,
asymmetrically
Catch offerings, charge
subscription,
symmetrically
Catch all,
charge high
Subscription_Fee Low High High
Transaction_Fee High Low Low, high
Fee_Allocation Low High Low
Prosp_Participant_Pool_Lng High Low High
Prosp_Participant_Pool_Pymnt High Low High
Offering_Inclusivity Low High High
Bundling Low Low High
Equity Low High Medium
Lending Low High Medium
Reward Medium Low High
Donation Medium Low High
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fees, (b) upfront, (c) on both sides of themarket. These choices effectively operate as a screeningmecha-
nism, deterring crowdfundees with low-quality projects as well as “tourist” crowdfunders who do not
intend to invest actively. The pursuit of a narrow accessibility strategy reinforces this approach. To facil-
itate performance analyses below, we defined Offerings_Subscription_Sym, which equals 1 for every
platform that is affiliated in this cluster, else zero.
The third cluster Catch All, Charge High consists of 108 platforms. As the label suggests,
these platforms bundle functions of several crowdfunding types. A limited fraction (17% of the
platforms in the cluster) bundle three or even four crowdfunding types. The most common
approach is to bundle reward and donation in a single platform (62% of the platforms in this
cluster).22 The choice reflects an assumption of commonalities in participants’ preferences and
hence an opportunity for economies of scale and scope. It further indicates that the competen-
cies needed to facilitate reward crowdfunding likely overlap with those required in donation
crowdfunding (e.g., mobilizing communities of participants who share a complex set of social
and financial motivations; also see Ryu, Kim, Kim, & Kim, 2017).
This strategy mix stands apart from the other two clusters. A key feature of Catch All,
Charge High platforms is that their all-embracing approach is manifested predominantly in
their non-pricing choices. A typical platform accommodates a wide range of offerings, broad
participant accessibility and a bundled approach. The pricing choices of these platforms exhibit
a less consistent pattern; an upfront subscription fee is common but is usually levied only on
one group of participants. To facilitate performance analyses, we defined CatchAll_ ChargeHigh
to equal 1 for every platform affiliated with this cluster, else zero.
In conclusion, European crowdfunding platforms cluster into three strategy mixes. Each
mix features a set of strategic choices that are arguably geared toward supporting successful
transactions. Every one of the 788 platforms is affiliated with one of the three strategy mixes.
However, platforms do not strictly adhere to the profile of the strategy mix they are affiliated
with.23 In fact, a study of platforms’ choices would be incomplete without recognizing that plat-
forms may choose to differentiate from the exact strategy mix profile. The variable Differentia-
tion captures the extent to which a given platform's strategic choices differ from the profile of
the strategy mix the platform is affiliated with.24 Formally, it is the Euclidian distance between
the focal platform and the centroid of the cluster to which it is affiliated, along the vector of the
strategic choices.25
Figure 1 presents a histogram of Differentiation. Several insights follow. First, we note some
level of differentiation in platforms’ strategic choices: Many platforms differ from the profile of
the strategy mix they are affiliated with. This underscores the fact that each platform proac-
tively makes choices that shape the pool of participants and offerings. This observation
advances an agentic view of platforms (i.e., platforms are agents that are in control of their
22Almost all the Bundled platforms include a reward approach, as can be seen from the fact that the binary variable
Reward takes the value of 0.95 (Table 3, Panel a: Cluster 3). A donation approach constitutes a close second (value of
0.77), whereas lending and equity approaches are a distant third and fourth (with values of 0.28 and 0.21, respectively).
23By construction, the cluster analysis implies that a platform i is associated with cluster x if its distance from the
centroid of cluster x is smaller than its distance from any other cluster. This is not to say that there is no variation
within a cluster. It is possible that both platforms i and j are part of cluster x, yet platform i is more distant from the
centroid of cluster x than platform j.
24Here, differentiation refers to the extent to which a platform differs from its strategy mix profile on multiple strategic
choices. It is not to be confused with differentiation on a single strategic choice (e.g., pursuing a specialist focus where
other platforms operate as generalists).
25In constructing Differentiation, we use cluster centroids which exclude the focal platform.
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strategy). Second, at the same time, the level of differentiation is moderate. About 64% of the
platforms differ along a couple of strategic choices, of which about a fifth of the platforms
closely adheres to the set of choices in their respective strategy mix. It is a noteworthy observa-
tion, given that there are hundreds of possible permutations of the strategic choices under scru-
tiny. The “closeness” to a small number of strategy mixes could be seen as an indication of the
interplay among platform choices. It underscores the need for a comprehensive approach to the
study of platform strategic choices. Taken together, these observations beg the question of
whether differentiation breeds results. We address this below.
5.1.2 | Platforms’ performance
We turn to investigate the association between strategic choices and performance. To that end,
we employ three performance measures; one that captures downside performance (dissolution),
and two measures of upside performance (growth in transaction amounts and web traffic).
Our data suggest that 788 crowdfunding platforms were launched across the EU-15 coun-
tries through the year 2016, of which 332 platforms (42%) were no longer active by the end of
2018. Table 4 reports the results of a Probit regression where Dissolved is the dependent vari-
able. The models include the strategy mix indicators and the differentiation variable. We control
for the number of years elapsed between the year a platform was launched and the last year in
our data (Year_Elapsed_2018). For each platform, we control for the characteristics of its home
country at the year of entry; GDP_Per_Capitae is the gross domestic product (in 1,000 euros) per
capita (source: World Bank), Population_Densitye is country population divided by its land area
(source: Eurostat), and Country_Failure_Ratee is the ratio between the number of firms dis-
solved and the number of firms active in the country (source: Eurostat).
FIGURE 1 Histogram of the level of differentiation in platforms’ strategic choices
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Model 1 presents a base model with the control variables. Neither GDP per capita nor popu-
lation density are statistically significant at conventional confidence levels. Conversely, both
Year_Elapsed_2018 and Country_Failure_Rate have positive and statistically significant coeffi-
cients (respectively, β = .14, p-value = .04 and β = .09, p-value = .04).
Model 2 adds the variable Differentiation as well as the strategy mix indicators. That is,
we include Participants_Transactions_Asy and CatchAll_ChargeHigh, while keeping
Offerings_Subscription_Sym as the omitted category. Both strategy mix indicators have coef-
ficients that are positive and statistically significant (β = .39, p-value = .00 and β = .61, p-
value = .00, respectively). Namely, nonfinancial (i.e., donation and reward) platforms and
platforms bundling several crowdfunding functions are 14 and 22% more likely to dissolve,
respectively, compared to financial (i.e., equity and lending) crowdfunding platforms.
As for Differentiation, it exhibits a negative and significant coefficient (β = −.22, p-
value = .00). Note that the specification includes the strategy mix indicators, such that Differen-
tiation captures the effect of platforms’ differentiation irrespective of the specific strategy mix
they are affiliated with. The fact that the coefficient is highly statistically significant indicates
that the strategic choices a focal platform undertakes, and specifically the extent to which it
chooses to deviate from the strategy mix it is affiliated with, are systematically associated with
its performance. Interestingly, the economic magnitude of the effect of differentiation is sizable
(the effects are calculated while holding the other variables at their means). As Differentiation
goes from its mean value to one standard deviation above it, the probability of platform dissolu-
tion decreases by a fifth; from 42% to 34%. The findings indicate that more differentiated plat-
forms exhibit greater longevity.
We now shift our attention from downside to upside performance, exploring platforms’
growth in transactions and traffic. Because growth models can be estimated only for platforms
that did not dissolve prior to December 2018, a survivorship bias may influence the relation-
ships between platform strategic choices and growth. Thus, in the analyses below we report
TABLE 4 Crowdfunding platform performance analysis: Likelihood of dissolution
Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. (SD) p Coeff. SD p
Constant −1.404 (0.346) [.000] −1.066 (0.408) [.009]
Participants_Transactions_Asy – 0.390 (0.104) [.000]
CatchAll_ChargeHigh – 0.614 (0.153) [.000]
Differentiation – −0.218 (0.063) [.001]
Years_Elapsed_2018 0.087 (0.024) [.000] 0.087 (0.025) [.001]
GDP_Per_Capitae 0.006 (0.006) [.329] 0.007 (0.006) [.280]
Population_Densitye −0.000 (0.000) [.487] −0.000 (0.000) [.509]
Country_Failure_Ratee 0.055 (0.024) [.022] 0.053 (0.025) [.032]
Number of observations 788 788
Pseudo-R2 0.024 0.059
Note: Results for Probit regression. The omitted strategy mix is Offerings_Subscription_Sym. Robust standard
errors in parentheses; p values in square brackets.
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estimates based on a two-stage sample selection model (Heckman, 1979). As the first-stage
selection equation, we use the dissolution model (Model 2 in Table 4).26
In the second stage, the main analyses report the estimation of growth models with the two
proxies of platforms’ performance; Transaction_Growth and Traffic_Growth. We were able to
obtain growth information for the majority of the 456 active platforms; we have performance
information for 311 platforms (i.e., 68% of surviving platforms), including transaction amounts
and web traffic for 194 (43%) and 211 (46%) platforms, respectively.
Tables 5 and 6 report regression analyses for the logarithms of Transactions_Growth and
Traffic_Growth, respectively. Both tables report Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions using
sampling weights.27 The models follow a specification that is common in the literature testing
Gibrat's law, with the measure of growth on the left-hand side and the logarithms of size and
age on the right-hand side (Evans, 1987a, 1987b). Other regressors include variables capturing
platforms’ strategic choices, the controls GDP_Per_Capita and Population_ Density in 2016, and
the Inverse Mills ratio which is calculated using the first stage.
Table 5 presents the analyses of growth in platforms’ transaction amounts. Model 1 reports
the base model, including only controls. The coefficient for a platform's past transaction
amount is negative and statistically significant (β = −.20, p-value = .07), while all the other vari-
ables, including the Inverse Mills ratio, are not statistically significant at traditional levels.
In Model 2, we add Differentiation as well as the binary variables Parti-
cipants_Transactions_Asy and CatchAll_ChargeHigh (the omitted category is again
Offerings_Subscription_Sym). The coefficients of both variables are negative and statistically sig-
nificant (β = −3.8, p-value = .02, and β = −5.5, p-value = .01 respectively). These findings indi-
cate financial (i.e., equity and lending) crowdfunding platforms experience a higher rate of
growth in annual transaction amount compared to platforms in the other strategy mixes. The
finding is consistent with broader patterns in the crowdfunding sector (Wardrop, Zhang,
Rau, & Gray, 2015) and underscores the important role of financially orientated crowdfunding.
The coefficient for Differentiation is positive and statistically significant (β = .72, p-
value = .05). Namely, more differentiated platforms exhibit greater growth rates. This result is
in line with the previous analysis: Differentiation is negatively correlated with downside perfor-
mance (dissolution) and positively correlated with upside (growth). The magnitude of the effect
is meaningful: A one-standard deviation increase of Differentiation is associated with a 64%
increase in the growth in transaction amount. Finally, the control for past platform's transac-
tion amount retains its sign, while the negative coefficients of both platform age and the Inverse
Mills ratio become significant.
Table 6 presents analyses of platforms’ growth in web traffic. Model 1 reports the base
model, including only controls. The coefficient for platform's past transaction amount is nega-
tive and significant (β = −.18, p-value = .00), while the other variables are not statistically sig-
nificant at traditional levels.
In Model 2, we add Differentiation as well as the strategy mix indicators (again, keeping
Offerings_Subscription_Sym as the omitted category). The coefficient for Parti-
cipants_Transactions_Asy is not statistically significant (β = −.17, p-value = .27), while
26Because the Heckman procedure is susceptible to identification problems (Sartori, 2003), we use Country_Failure_Rate
as the exclusion restriction variable; i.e. a variable that explains selection but is unrelated to growth in a platform's web
traffic or transaction amounts.
27The weights denote the inverse of the probability that each platform is included in the analysis based on the
distribution of strategy mix clusters in the sample and the population of surviving platforms.
DUSHNITSKY ET AL. 23
CatchAll_ChargeHigh is negative and significant (β = −.61, p-value = .02). As for Differentiation,
the coefficient is positive and statistically significant (β = .17, p-value = .09). The more a plat-
form is differentiated from the profile of the strategy mix it is affiliated with, the higher is its
TABLE 5 Crowdfunding platform performance analysis: Growth in transaction amount
Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. (SD) p Coeff. (SD) p
Constant −1.436 (3.406) [.714] 6.955 (1.385) [.052]
Participants_Transactions_Asy – −3.791 (0.534) [.019]
CatchAll_ChargeHigh – −5.452 (0.649) [.011]
Differentiation – 0.719 (0.165) [.049]
Ln_Transactions −0.198 (0.057) [.074] −0.287 (0.047) [.026]
Ln_Traffic – –
Ln_Platform_Age −0.127 (0.565) [.844] −1.382 (0.326) [.051]
GDP_Per_Capita 0.080 (0.037) [.163] 0.059 (0.038) [.259]
Population_Density −0.001 (0.003) [.854] 0.001 (0.003) [.831]
Inverse_Mills_Ratio 1.289 (0.835) [.262] −6.141 (1.385) [.047]
Number of observations 194 194
Pseudo-R2 .060 .125
Note: Results for second-stage of Heckman-selection model. The second-stage regressions are estimated using
OLS regression. The omitted strategy mix is Offerings_Subscription_Sym. Robust standard errors in parentheses;
p values in square brackets.
TABLE 6 Crowdfunding platform performance analysis: Growth in web traffic
Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. (SD) p Coeff. (SD) p
Constant 1.788 (0.511) [.001] 2.571 (0.681) [.000]
Participants_Transactions_Asy – −0.165 (0.148) [.266]
CatchAll_ChargeHigh – −0.607 (0.256) [.019]
Differentiation – 0.174 (0.104) [.094]
Ln_Transactions – –
Ln_Traffic −0.178 (0.029) [.000] −0.182 (0.029) [.000]
Ln_Platform_Age −0.026 (0.103) [.792] −0.247 (0.164) [.134]
GDP_Per_Capita 0.009 (0.006) [.132] 0.007 (0.006) [.236]
Population_Density 0.000 (0.000) [.471] 0.000 (0.000) [.436]
Inverse_Mills_Ratio −0.080 (0.186) [.665] −0.888 (0.477) [.064]
Number of observations 211 211
Pseudo-R2 0.195 0.215
Note: Results for second stage of Heckman-selection model. The second-stage regressions are estimated using
OLS regression. The omitted strategy mix is Offerings_Subscription_Sym. Robust standard errors in parentheses;
p values in square brackets.
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rate of web traffic growth. The effect is fairly large; a one-standard deviation increase of Differ-
entiation is associated with a 15% increase in web traffic growth.
To conclude, the findings suggest that platforms’ strategic choices are associated with
subsequent performance. Moreover, the impact on performance is correlated with the extent
to which platforms differ from the strategy mix profile they are affiliated with. These find-
ings are consistent across several performance variables. Next, we discuss how the findings
inform our understanding of crowdfunding platforms, in particular, and transaction plat-
forms, in general.
6 | INTERPRETATION
Our analyses of 788 crowdfunding platforms offer insights for scholars working at the inter-
section of the platform and strategic management literatures. The empirical patterns we docu-
mented shed light on the strategic choices crowdfunding platforms—which are an example of
transaction platforms—mix together, as well as on how these mixes—and differentiation
therefrom—are associated with platforms’ performance. Below, we interpret our findings in
light of the broader platform literature; drawing on existing debates and pointing to key
takeaways. The discussion is organized into four key insights.
6.1 | Insight (1): Common mixes of strategic choices
We observe that crowdfunding platforms cluster around a notably limited number of strategy
mixes. Although there are hundreds of ways to mix the strategic choices under scrutiny, our
analysis reveals that platforms’ choices cluster into three strategy mixes. This observation sug-
gests that platforms’ (pricing and non-pricing) strategic choices are interrelated. It further hints
that platforms deliberately pursue a mix of strategic choices in an effort to create value to their
participants.
Across the three clusters, the strategic choices that platforms mix together seem to
exhibit a common logic. This is nicely illustrated by looking at the cluster Catch All, Charge
All. To expand the participant pool, these platforms pursue an all-embracing agenda in their
choices of non-pricing strategies; pursuing an inclusive approach by accommodating a wide
range of offerings, enhancing accessibility by supporting multiple languages and payment
systems, as well as bundling several functions within a single platform. At the same time,
they deploy pricing strategies that are of a more constricting nature; platforms in the Catch
All, Charge All cluster levy subscription fees and often charge high transaction fees. These
platforms seem to be using pricing and non-pricing strategies in tandem, where the latter
are geared towards expansion while the former towards curation. This strategy mix, when
appropriate, may result in a pool of broad yet high-quality participants and offerings. This
observation echoes a recent stream of work that explicitly studies the interplay between
pricing and non-pricing strategies (Boudreau & Hagiu, 2009; Cennamo & Santalo, 2013;
Li & Pénard, 2014; Zhu & Iansiti, 2012).
The analyses further reveal that platforms undertake a mix of expansion and curation
choices not only across pricing or non-pricing strategies, but also within each group of strat-
egies. Consider the platforms within the Catch Participants, Charge Transaction, Asymmetri-
cally cluster. Typically, they set little or no subscription fees, while charging high
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transaction fees. These pricing strategies have expansive and curating effects respectively.
These platforms adopt an equally balanced approach to non-pricing strategies; adopting lan-
guages spoken by hundreds of millions of people while usually supporting only a narrow
range of offerings. The examples illustrate the trade-offs are also managed within each
group of strategic choices (i.e., pricing and non-pricing strategies). To the best of our knowl-
edge, the interplay between strategic choices in the same group (especially among non-
pricing strategies) received little attention in the literature. It poses fertile ground for
future work.
6.2 | Insight (2): Strategy mixes and environmental factors
Why do platforms pursue certain mixes of strategic choices? The previous insight suggests a
common theme—balancing expansion and curation—but it offers little guidance as to the rea-
son why we observe platforms juxtaposing different strategic choices to that end. For example,
one may ponder why the clusters Catch Participants, Charge Transactions, Asymmetrically and
Catch Offerings, Charge Subscription, Symmetrically exhibit an exact opposite set of strategic
choices; the platforms in the former cluster expand participation and narrow the range of offer-
ings, while platforms in the latter opt for a flipped approach.
These strategic choices likely reflect the environment in which a platform operates. The
platform literature investigates these issues, focusing on environmental factors such as the
nature and number of participants, the offerings and the intensity of market failures (Claussen
et al., 2015; Evans & Schmalensee, 2016; Halaburda et al., 2018; Parker & van Alstyne, 2014;
Seamans & Zhu, 2017). In the following, we first summarize extant arguments and then draw
on these arguments to derive insights into platforms’ strategy mixes.
The nature of participants can vary across environments. One environment may be charac-
terized by homogeneous preferences; participants value similar offerings and features. In
another environment, different participants may value different offerings and distinct features
such that the environment exhibits heterogeneous preferences. It follows that search costs are
likely higher in the latter environment. Next, we shift to the nature of the offerings and ensuing
market frictions. Some offerings (e.g., commodities and other well-established products or ser-
vices) are simpler to communicate, relatively easy to certify and carry little or medium cost of
inventory and distribution. On the other extreme, offerings with limited or unobservable cre-
dentials are susceptible to critical market frictions; even when participants share similar prefer-
ences, they face severe information asymmetries that could result in market failures. It follows
that transaction costs are likely higher in the latter environment.
Each platform operates in an environment that has a distinct set of underlying factors
(i.e., participants, offerings, and market frictions) and associated costs (i.e., search costs, transac-
tion costs). In turn, these factors shape the platform's choice of strategies and the exact mix
thereof. Consider a platform targeting an environment where participants’ preferences are
homogenous but it is plagued with asymmetric information regarding offerings’ quality. The for-
mer indicates low to moderate search costs and suggests a platform may opt to “go wide”, that is,
pursue an inclusive strategy that accommodates a wide range of offerings. To the extent that this
approach generates a sufficient volume of prospective transactions, there is no need to further bol-
ster market thickness by aggressively expanding participants’ numbers. The uncertainty around
offerings’ quality implies significant transaction costs. A reasonable strategy, therefore, may be to
set transaction fees low and subscription fees high. The upfront (subscription) fees can act as a
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screening mechanism that deters low-quality offerings and therefore secures transaction safety on
the platform. And, at the same time, the high subscription fees enable the platform to lower trans-
action fees. This discussion helps us interpret the strategy mix of Catch Offerings, Charge Subscrip-
tion, Symmetrically platforms. The cluster is populated by platforms that chose to operate either
an equity or a lending based crowdfunding. They operate in an environment characterized by
homogenous preferences (for financial returns) and intense asymmetric information (regarding
project's quality). As this cluster's label indicates, we document a mix of strategic choices consis-
tent with the aforementioned theoretical argument.
Next, consider a platform operating under the inverse environmental conditions. Specifi-
cally, different participants value different features such that preferences are heterogeneous and
there is no objectively superior offering. This environment is characterized by high search costs
and lower transaction costs. The platform may opt to “go deep”; combine an exclusive offering
strategy, which economizes on search costs, with a broad participation strategy, to achieve a
sufficient volume of prospective transactions. To further bolster market thickness, the platform
should lower upfront subscription fee and ideally allocate fees to one group (the less sensitive
one).28 Indeed, this discussion helps us interpret the Catch Participants, Charge Transactions,
Asymmetrically strategy mix. This cluster is populated by donation and reward crowdfunding
platforms. They operate in an environment characterized by heterogeneous preferences for
social and nonpecuniary returns. Again, our analysis of these platforms finds evidence of strate-
gic choices that are aligned with the theoretical arguments.
Finally, a platform may target environments where participants’ preferences are heteroge-
neous and there are also substantial market frictions. This may be the case when a platform
attempts to serve the aforementioned environments concurrently. One way to mitigate fric-
tions regarding the quality of the offerings may be to screen on observables (e.g., a platform
can require proof of authenticity as a prerequisite of participation). To the extent that screen-
ing on observables is not feasible (e.g., the offering is for the development of future business,
the outcome of which is unknown at this time), the platform could adopt upfront subscription
fees. The advantage of this strategic choice is that it can deter low-quality offerings and has
the effect of removing frictions and enhancing safety. The disadvantage, however, is that it
could impede participation altogether. To offset this effect, the platform can choose all-
embracing non-pricing strategies (e.g., enhancing accessibility and inclusivity). The ultimate
success of this strategy mix is contingent on whether it can overcome the double-challenge of
high search and transaction costs. This discussion helps us interpret the Catch All, Charge All
cluster. The platforms within this cluster face such an environment. They engage in a seem-
ingly consistent strategy mix; an expansive set of non-pricing strategies and high
subscription fees.
To conclude, transaction platforms face a multitude of environmental factors. The nature
of these factors and the intensity of the associated costs vary across different settings. Thus, it
is not surprising that different platforms undertake different strategic choices. Nonetheless,
the three seemingly distinct strategy mixes do have at least one thing in common. They share
the insight that the ultimate goal of every transaction platform is to balance expansion and
curation efforts such that participants enjoy valuable transactions. The specific trade-offs and
choices that realize this goal are a function of the underlying environmental factors, but the
three mixes likely share a similar logic. This insight resonates with recent platform studies
(Cennamo & Santalo, 2013) and underscores strategic management long-standing effort to
understand the combination of choices that firms undertake (Porter, 1996; Porter &
Siggelkow, 2008).
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6.3 | Insight (3): The competitive crowding dilemma
As the previous insight discusses, transaction platforms often balance expansion and curation.
The specific mix of strategic choices may vary across environments, but the fundamental need
to manage the trade-off likely persists for all platforms. We turn to discuss a related dilemma
that has attracted the attention of the platform literature. Specifically, transaction platforms
have to decide between two distinct and potentially competing forces shaping network effects
(Cennamo, 2019; Rysman, 2009). On the one hand, participants derive value from indirect net-
work effects; that is, a large pool of participants and offerings on the other side of the platform.
On the other hand, they have aversion to over-crowding and competition on their own side of
the platform (hereafter, competitive crowding effect). Which of these two forces dominates and
how might it affect platforms’ strategic choices remains a theoretical and empirical puzzle.
A careful investigation of the three strategy mixes informs these questions. Recall our earlier
observations that Catch Offerings, Charge Subscription, Symmetrically platforms opt for a “go
wide” strategy, whereas Catch Participants, Charge Transactions, Asymmetrically platforms “go
deep”. While seemingly contradictory, both exemplify a case where the pursuit of indirect net-
work effects seems to dominate over concerns of competitive crowding.
Consider Catch Offering, Charge Subscription, Symmetrically platforms. Where participants’
preferences are homogenous and search costs are low, a platform that includes a wide range of
offerings enables greater search and hence more valuable matching. However, in doing so it
effectively increases the competition among the different offerings. Our empirical setting offers
an instructive example. A lending crowdfunding platform that lists numerous offerings by bor-
rowers allows lenders to search across more prospects and secure the most attractive terms. But
that comes at the cost of increased competition among borrowers.
Next, we turn to the Catch Participants, Charge Transaction, Asymmetrically platforms
where participants’ preferences are heterogeneous (see Insight (2)). This strategy mix combines
a narrow range of offerings (aimed at coalescing around shared interests) with an explicitly
broad participation strategy and low upfront subscription fee levied on one side (i.e., three stra-
tegic choices bolstering market thickness). Arguably, this strategy mix also focuses on indirect-
network effects over competitive crowding. By way of example, think of a donation
crowdfunding platform focused on individuals with healthcare needs which attracts partici-
pants from multiple countries. This approach may channel funding to a few who are in most
dire need but it also implies intense competition among all individuals.
To conclude, the strategy mixes we document indicate that platforms prioritize indirect net-
work effects at the risk of more intense same-side competition. Interestingly, we observe this
pattern across different mixes and environments that vary in the intensity of search and trans-
action costs. The extent to which it applies to other platform settings is a valid question. Argu-
ably, this pattern should be viewed with an eye to the boundary conditions characteristics of
the crowdfunding setting.29
29We qualify this insight and highlight a few boundary conditions. For example, the number of offerings on a
crowdfunding platform may be below the scale which brings about intense competitive crowding (Boudreau, 2010).
Moreover, the negative competitive effect could be attenuated due to the many-to-one nature of crowdfunding
transactions (i.e., each project aggregates funding across multiple crowdfunders such that an increase in the number of
crowdfunders does not necessarily result in more intense same-side competition for a focal project). That said, an
increase in the number of crowdfundees is likely to evoke greater same-side competition. Finally, crowdfunding
platforms may attenuate competitive crowding in other ways which are not readily observable.
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6.4 | Insight (4): Platforms’ performance
We observe that platforms’ performance is sensitive to the mix of strategic choices they adopt.
We also observe that many platforms differentiate from the strategy mix profile they are affili-
ated with, and differentiation is associated with greater platform longevity.30 Moreover, differ-
entiation is associated with superior up-side performance; both growth in web traffic to a
platform as well as growth in transaction amount. Below, we discuss generalizable implications
to the platform literature.
First, the findings are consistent with a theoretical prediction that, in the presence of net-
work effects, even small differences between platforms can impact performance (Arthur, 1989;
Katz & Shapiro, 1992). Past empirical work supports this prediction. For example, platforms
that choose to differentiate their accessibility strategy (e.g., pursuing a more open approach)
experience superior performance (Baldwin & von Hippel, 2011; Boudreau, 2010; Eisenmann
et al., 2009). Our analysis supplements this work by looking at the overall strategy mix. We
show that differentiation is positively associated with performance, and that pattern goes
beyond any specific strategic choices.
Recent anecdotal evidence resonates with these findings. Consider insights from Andreessen
Horowitz, the venture capitalist firm that backed Box, GitHub, Lyft, Slack, and Zynga. Their
explicit view and investment thesis are that platforms with a differentiated strategy mix may
better cater to certain participants and offerings and hence experience substantial growth; “they
serve the needs of users in their vertical so much better that they can compete for a much larger
share of their vertical…”.31 Andreessen Horowitz provides the following example: “The leading
digital real estate platform in the U.S., Zillow… [facilitates] from buying/selling a home, to leas-
ing or renting a home/apartment, to sourcing home loans, to finding an agent. It's current mar-
ket cap is $7 billion. But those are a lot of different marks, with different business models and
different users… [other successful platforms are] Compass, OpenDoor, and FlyHomes…” They
also discuss successful differentiation in the context of transaction platforms for video
(YouTube vs. Twitch, TikTok, etc.) and employment (LinkedIn vs. Hired, Wonolo, etc.).
Second, our findings further inform the likely mechanisms that underlie platforms’ perfor-
mance. Extant work offers a range of explanations regarding the impact of differentiation. On
the one hand, a platform that opts to differentiate from the profile of the strategy mix it is affili-
ated with may be susceptible to a loss of alignment and blurring of strategic focus (Cennamo &
Santaló, 2015). Extant work suggests that the resulting loss of alignment erodes platforms’ abil-
ity to realize network effects and could have adverse performance implications. On the other
hand, other studies postulate about a number of advantageous mechanisms that may give rise
to a positive differentiation-performance association. For example, differentiation can realize
network effects through the discovery of latent demand (Boudreau, 2010; Eisenmann
et al., 2009). It may also strengthen platforms’ value proposition to its existing participant pool
(Lee et al., 2006; Shankar & Bayus, 2003; Suarez, 2005). Finally, differentiation crystalizes and
augments a focal platform's value-add vis-à-vis other platforms (Cennamo & Santalo, 2013;
Seamans & Zhu, 2014). Our results are consistent with such advantageous mechanisms.
In sum, our findings corroborate extant platform research and highlight areas for further
work. In line with past work, our observations allude to a substantial level of interplay between
30As we clarified in footnote 24, differentiation refers to the extent a platform differs from the profile of the strategy mix
it is affiliated with.
31The article is available at https://a16z.com/2019/09/11/platforms-verticals-unbundling/.
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platform strategic choices (e.g., Boudreau & Hagiu, 2009; Cennamo & Santalo, 2013; Zhu &
Iansiti, 2012). In addition, our analyses identify opportunities for theory development. Consider
the evidence that platforms cluster into three common strategy mix profiles. This directs future
work to focus on the cumulative impact of platforms’ overall strategy mix, in addition to the
investigation of specific strategic choices. Moreover, per Insights (2) and (3), one could explore
the prospect of equifinality in platforms’ strategic choices; namely, the extent to which seem-
ingly different strategy mixes can equally stimulate network effects. Per Insight (4), we wonder
whether a platform should focus solely on the environmental factors characteristic of its partici-
pants when crafting its strategic choices or should it deliberate other platforms and their strate-
gic choices. A dual view that focuses on participants inside the platform as well as other
platforms outside can prove fertile ground for future work.
7 | CONCLUSIONS
We present a large-N inductive study of the population of European crowdfunding platforms.
Across these 788 transaction platforms, we documented several key patterns. First, we observe
that hundreds of platforms cluster around three common mixes of strategic choices. Second,
not all platforms strictly adhere to the profile of the strategy mix they are affiliated with. Third,
platforms’ performance is sensitive to their strategic choices. Specifically, there is a positive
association (though notably we do not test for causation) between the degree to which the
choices of a focal crowdfunding platform differentiate from the profile of the strategy mix it is
affiliated with and platform's subsequent performance. The previous section discusses the find-
ings at length and derives four key insights to inform future works on transaction platforms.
Our contributions lie at the intersection of the platform and strategic management litera-
tures. Empirically, we believe that the sheer scale of the empirical investigation—documenting
six strategic choices across hundreds of platforms—makes a contribution. As a large-N induc-
tive study, our work does not aim to develop or test theoretical hypotheses, but it may offer vali-
dation and extension of extant work. Specifically, we supplement the platform literature where
empirical studies either focus on a careful investigation of a large number of strategic choices
by a handful of platforms (Boudreau & Hagiu, 2009; Li & Pénard, 2014; Schilling, 2002), or use
data from several dozen platforms while testing causal hypotheses concentrating on a few stra-
tegic choices (Cennamo & Santalo, 2013; Claussen et al., 2013; Zhu & Iansiti, 2012).
Importantly, the unique data facilitate theoretical development. Drawing on strategy work
(Gruber et al., 2010; Porter & Siggelkow, 2008), we advocate a comprehensive view of strategic
choices to the platform literature. We do so by documenting patterns that uncover platforms’
strategy mix. The advantage of a comprehensive approach is evident, for example, by looking at
the crowdfunding literature. Extant work employs a crowdfunding typology where crowdfunders’
investment logic is the sole classification rationale (i.e., donation, reward, lending or equity; Flem-
ing & Sorenson, 2016). Our results show that crowdfunding type is not a single, standalone choice
but rather is associated with a broad mix of (pricing and non-pricing) strategic choices.
7.1 | Limitations and directions for future research
Like any study, our paper has limitations that open up avenues for future research. One set
of limitations comes from our empirical setting. First, crowdfunding platforms are highly
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popular transaction platforms; nonetheless, one should be mindful of the unique character-
istics of the crowdfunding setting, as discussed in Section 3. Future work could investigate
other types of transaction platforms to understand whether these results generalize to other
contexts. For instance, a possible replication setting is that of dating platforms, which are
gaining momentum among laypersons and scholars alike (Bryant & Sheldon, 2017;
Halaburda et al., 2018). This setting is also interesting because dating platforms differ from
crowdfunding platforms on some of the underlying characteristics; for example, the content
of the transaction (respectively, participants’ time versus capital), or the way in which par-
ticipants consummate their transactions (one-to-one versus many-to-one). Such investiga-
tion not only establishes generalizability across different platform settings, but also sheds
light on the impact of the underlying characteristics.
Second, we welcome studies that expand the geographical coverage beyond the EU-15 coun-
tries. Although crowdfunding platforms are supposedly accessible from all over the world, prior
work finds a geographical proximity effect (Agrawal et al., 2015). The proximity effect may
reflect similarity in socioeconomics, culture and values that result in an excessive occurrence of
within-country matches. We are fortunate to have quality work on prominent US-based plat-
forms such as Kickstarter (e.g., Colombo, Franzoni, & Rossi-Lamastra, 2015; Mollick, 2014; Sor-
enson, Assenova, Li, Boada, & Fleming, 2016), Prosper (e.g., Hildebrand, Puri, & Rocholl, 2016;
Lin, Prabhala, & Viswanathan, 2013), and others (e.g., Bapna, 2019; Burtch, Ghose, &
Wattal, 2015). Replicating our analysis across multiple platforms in different countries could
establish boundary conditions and further inform other transaction platform settings.
Another set of limitations is associated with the operationalization of platforms’ strategic
choices. Other strategic choices (e.g., advertising or innovating the internal organization) may
influence transaction platforms’ success. Studying these strategic choices is beyond the scope of
this paper. Moreover, we are not aware of any systematic approach for collecting and coding
data on these strategic choices across hundreds of different platforms. Future work can explore
questions such as: Do some strategy mixes require more investments in advertising as they are
less attractive for participants? Do some strategy mixes require an innovative internal organiza-
tion as they are challenging to deploy?
7.2 | Managerial implications
Despite these limitations, our study offers interesting insights for practitioners and policy-
makers involved in the development of transaction platforms. In particular, we witness that
platforms’ (pricing and non-pricing) strategic choices are associated with platform survival, web
traffic and total value of the transactions enabled. This finding indicates the fate of transaction
platforms need not be sealed by first-mover advantage that inevitably leads to a winner-takes-
all outcome (Eisenmann et al., 2006; Hagiu, 2009). Transaction platforms may succeed by
devising the mix of strategic choices to leverage the diverse preferences of distinct groups of
participants. Platform managers could also consider the option not to mimic the strategic
choices undertaken by other platforms in their sector. Our results, indeed, suggest that differen-
tiation from the strategy mix profile a platform is affiliated with is a common practice; one that
exhibits a positive correlation with platforms’ performance. In sum, our results encourage trans-
action platforms’ managers to adopt a comprehensive approach whereby the various elements
align to better coordinate participants from the distinct groups.
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